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question has not as yet been decided under any of the "guest statutes."
In Indiana the doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk is not confined
to master-servant cases, but extends to other cases sounding in tort.15 In
the cases where a statute requires employers to guard dangerous machinery
the doctrine of assumption of risk can apply,16 even though liability im-
posed upon the employer who fails to comply with the statute is absolute
and not based upon negligence. Again, the keeper of wild animals is held
to strict liability for injuries caused by those animals, yet the injured
person may have assumed the risk and be barred from recovering from
the keeper of the animals.17 Thus, both under liability imposed by statute
and by common law, assumption of risk has been held to bar recovery.
Reasoning from these analogies it follows that assumption of risk, in a
proper case, might bar recovery under the "guest" statutes. C. A. R.
NEGLIGENCE-INFANT TRESPASSERS-ATTRACTIVE NUIsANCE DOCTRINE.-
The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant to. recover damages
for the death of his infant son eleven years old. It appeared from the
plaintiff's complaint that the defendant was the owner of twenty acres of
land, on which there was an abandoned mine. The entrance to the mine
shaft was covered by a shed, which with a number of other abandoned
buildings made an inviting place for children to play; and children did
come on the premises and played about the buildings, frequently, with the
knowledge of the defendant. Gasses ("damps") of a poisonous character
formed in the shaft and the shed. Their presence could not be seen or
ascertained, and they were highly dangerous. The defendant knew of
the location of the shaft, and open door, the "damps," and the frequency
of the presence of children; or by the exercise of a reasonable care could
have known of their presence. Defendant negligently left the door open.
The plaintiff child, through no negligence of the plaintiff, entered the shed
and was suffocated by the gases. The defendant demurred to the com-
plaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. The demurrer was sustained and the plaintiff appeals.
Held, the complaint stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
under the attractice nuisance doctrine.1
The Supreme Court of the United States decided that a railway com-
pany was liable in an action by a child six years of age when he hurt
himself upon a turntable notwithstanding the contention that the child
was a trespasser to whom the company owed no duty to make its premises
safe.2 This decision created a particular exception to the general rule that
there is no affirmative duty on the part of the landowner to make his
land safe for trespassers but only the duty to refrain from intentionally
or wantonly injuring them.3 Since that case the majority of the juris-
"Inludiana Natural Gas &- Oil Co. v. O'Brien (1903), 160 Ind. 266, 65 N. E. 918,
66 N. E. 782.
"Montieth v. Kokomo Enameling Co. (1902), 159 Ind. 149, 64 N. E. 610.
"'Maloy v. Starin (1906), 113 App. Div. 852, 99 N. Y. Supp. 603.
'Drew v. Lett, Appellate Court of Indiana, October 6, 1932.
2 Sioux City & Pacific 1R. R. Co. v. Stout (1873), 17 Wall. 657, 21 L. Ed. 745.
3Thompson, Law of Negligence, 871, 874; Pen= v. McCormick (1890), 125 Ind.
116, 25 N. E. 156, 21 A. L. R. 271, 9 L. R. A. 313; Indianapolis, Peru & Chicago
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dictions in the United States have come to recognize this exception fre-
quently referred to as the doctrine of the turntable cases or the "attracive
nuisance" doctrine.4
This general rule as to trespassers embodies the concept that the land-
owner is sovereign within the boundaries of his own land. But it may be
said that this concept has yielded to social necessity. The immunity of the
occupier of land from responsibility for acts upon it has been greatly
diminished by making him answerable in certain instances for injuries to
trespassers caused by the dangerous condition of the land.5 The problem
involved here is to give the proper weight to two social interests; first, the
social interest in freedom of young children from serious bodily injury
resulting from dangerous conditions on the land; second, the social interest
in the unfettered use of the land by the occupiers thereof.6 If the greater
weight is placed on the first, the attractive nuisance doctrine is applied;
if the weight is placed upon the second, the doctrine will not be applied.7
The so-called attractive nuisance doctrine may be stated as follows.8
An occupier of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young chil-
dren trespassing on his land caused by a structure or other artificial con-
dition 9 which he maintains upon the land; if the place where the condi-
tion is maintained is one upon which the occupier knows or as a reasonable
man would know that such children are likely to trespass;lO if the condition
is one which he realizes or should realize involves unreasonable risk of
death or serious badily harm to such children;1 and the children because
of their tender years do not discover the condition or realize the risk in-
volved in intermeddling or in coming within the area made dangerous
R. Co. v. Pitzer (1886), 109 Ind. 179, 6 N. E. 310; Hnapp v. Daul (1913), 180 Ind.
526, 103 N. E. 385. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts,
Tentative Draft No. 4, Sec. 203, p. 136.
4 36 A. L. R. 66; 45 A. L. R. 983; 45 C. J. 753.
5 F. Bohlen, 69 U. of Pa. L. R. 347, Studies in Torts, p. 190.
6See Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Fox (1906), 38 Ind. App. 268, 70 N. B. 81;
Holstein v. Director General of Railroads (1921), 77 Ind. App. 582, 139 N. V. 303,
where this interplay of social interests seems to have been recognized by the
courts. See 36 Harv. L. Rev. 843.
7 Ryan v. Tower (1901), 128 Mich. 463, 87 N. W. 644, 92 Am. St. Rep. 412.
8 This statement is substantially that found in American Law Institute, Restate-
ment of the Law of Torts, Tentative Draft No. 4, p. 152, Sec. 209.
'See to the effect that it is almost impossible to draw the line between what is
artificial and natural, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 852.
10 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Fox (1906), 38 Ind. App. 268, 70 N. E. 81; Lewis V.
Cleveland, etc., R1. Co. (1908), 42 Ind. App. 337, 84 N. F. 23; Fretz Maurice -v.
Conn. R. & Lighting Co. (1905), 78 Conn. 406, 62 Atl. 620, 3 L. R. A. (n. s.) 449,
112 A. S. R. 159; Atlantic & TV. P. R. Co. v. Green (1917), 246 Fed. 676; Hardy
v. Mo. Pac. Rd. Co. (1920), 266 Fed. 860. It seems that the courts mean that the
presence of children must be reasonably anticipated, when they say the child
must be "allured," "attracted," or "tempted" to come on the premises. McDermott
v. Burke (1912), 256 111. 401, 100 N. E. 168; Fitzgerald v. Rogers (1901), 58 App.
Div. 298, 68 N. Y. Sup. 946.
"Lewis v. Cleveland, etc. 11. Co. (1908), 42 Ind. App. 337, 84 N. E. 23; MEKiddy
v. Des Moines Electric Co. (1926), 202 Ia. 225, 206 N. W. 815; Carr v. Oregon-
Washington R. & Nav. Co. (1927), 123 Ore. 359, 261 Pac. 899.
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by it;12 and the utility of maintaining the condition is slight as compared
with the risk to young children invblved.13
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently added a restric-
tion to the doctrine as stated above by requiring that the child must be
attracted on to the premises by the condition maintained upon them.14
Where the dangerous potentialities of the condition are obvious to children
and the risk is appreciated by them, there is no liability on the occupier.15
This limitation prevents liability attaching to maintaining on the prem-
ises many necessary and usual implements which are essential to the
normal use of the land, but which children may use to their injury.16
Where the child realizes the danger of the condition or structure, and yet
through bravado or an immature recklessness plays with it and is injured,
there is no recovery. The rule is to protect children from danger they
are not likely to appreciate.
The doctrine imposes an affirmative duty to use due care in guarding
against injury to the trespassing children.17 The occupier must make
the land reasonably safe for the children coming on to the prem-
ises.1 8 What is due care in the particular case is a question of fact
which varies; it may require guarding the dangerous condition,19 or
1 City of Indianapolis v. Emmelman (1886), 108 Ind. 530, 9 N. E. 155, 58 A. I.
R. 65; Indianapolis Water Co. v. Harold (1907), 170 Ind. 170, 83 N. E. 993; Lewis
v. Cleveland, etc. B. Co. (1908), 42 Ind. App. 337, 84 N. E. 23.
1Chicago, etc., B. Co. v. Fox, 38 Ind. App. 268, 70 N. 9. 81; Cincinnati Spring
Co. v. Brown (1903), 32 Ind. App. 58, 69 N. E. 198; Lewis v. Cleveland, etc. R. Co.
(1908), 42 Ind. App. 268, 84 N. E. 23; Erickson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. H.
R. Co. (1925), 165 Minn. 106, 205 N. W. 889, 24 A. L Rt. 973; Carr V. Oregon-
'Washington R. & Nay. Co. (1927), 123 Ore. 259, 261 Pac. 899.
14 United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Van Brett (1922), 258 U. S. 268, 66 L. Ed. 615,
42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 299, 36 A. D. R. 28. This decision has been criticized as making
the rule too rigid, and has been approved of as tempering the doctrine and there-
fore making sure it will continue to exist in the law. See 36 Harv. L. Rev. 113.
Indiana cases contain language that would seem to be in accord with this limita-
tion: City of Indianapolis v. Emmelman (1886), 108 Ind. 530, 9 N. 'K. 155, 58
A. L. R. 65; Holstein v. Director General of Railroads (1921), 77 nd. App. 582,
134 N. E. 303; Indianapolis Motor Speedway Co. v. Shoup (1929), 88 Ind. App.
572, 165 N. E. 246. But see Fort Wayne, etc. Traction Co. v. Stark (1920), 74
Ind. App. 669, 127 N. . 460. The American Law Institute In its Restatement of
the Law of Torts has expressly repudiated this limitation. See Restatement of
the Law of Torts, Tentative Draft No. 4, Sec. 209.
5City of Indianapolis v. Emmelman (1886), 108 Ind. 530, 9 N. E. 155, 58
A. L. R. 65; Indianapolis Water Co. v. Harold (1907), 170 Ind. 170, 83 N. E. 993;
Lewis v. Cleveland, etc. R. Co. (1908), 42 Ind. App. 337, 84 N. E. 23; Kent v.
Interstate Public Service Cor. (1929), 168 N. E. 465.
'5American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts, Tentative Draft
No. 4, Sec. 209, p. 152.
17 Cleveland, etc. 2. Co. v. Means (1915), 59 Ind. App. 383, 108 N. E. 375;
Holstein v. Directors of Railroads (1921), 77 Ind. App. 582, 134 N. E. 303.
28 City of Indianapolis v. Emmelman (1886), 108 Ind. 530, 9 N. B. 155, 58 A. L.
It. 65; Cincinnati, etc. Spring Co. v. Brown (1903), 32 Ind. 58,. 69 N. B. 198;
Chicago, etc. B. Co. v. Fox (1906), 38 Ind. App. 268, 70 N. E. 81; Lewis v. Cleve-
land, etc. R. Co. (1908) 42 Ind. App. 337, 84 N. E. 23; Ann Arbor R. Co. v. King
(1903), 68 Ohio -t. 210, 67 N. E. 479; Chicago, B. & Q. B. Co. v. Krayenbuhl
(1902), 65 Neb. 889, 91 N. W. 880, 59 L. 1t A. 920, 12 Am. Rep. 300.
9City of Indianapolis v. Emmelman (1886), 108 Ind. 530, 9 N. E. 155; City of
South Bend v. Turner (1901), 156 Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271.
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eliminating it altogether.2e The mere injury does not show a departure
from due care, and the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the de-
fendant was negligent.21 In determining what is due care, the degree
of danger connected with the condition, as well as the nature of the use
to which the land is put and the nature of the condition or structure in
question should be taken into account.2 2 In most cases due care will
require that the children be kept off the premises, if it is possible to keep
them off by fences or watchmen.23
Some courts attempt to bring this doctrine into conformity with the
general rule by calling the dangerous condition or structure a "trap" 2 4
or an "allurement," 2 5 or by treating it as an invitation to enter. 2 6 As has
been said, however, the word "trap" is a figure of speech and not a
formula.27 Even if the condition is a trap in the sense in which the term
is used to denote a danger known to the occupier and unknown to a
visitor, there still remains the necessity of proving that infants may come
within its reach. 2 8 The mere fact that the trespasser is ignorant of pit-
falls on the land is not enough to make the occupier liable if the tres-
passer falls into it.29 A child of tender years may be a trespasser.3 0
The word allurement implies in every other connection a thing done with
the purpose of alluring.3 1 In cases that come before the courts under
this doctrine, the occupier desires the children to stay off his land. The
word invitation also implies an act done or condition created which is at
least capable of being construed into a desire to receive the person
invited.32 Temptation is not an invitation. 3 3 It is submitted that these
phrases are a perversion of language and the underlying idea is that the
occupier, as a reasonably prudent man, should have anticipated that the
children would be attracted by the condition or structure on the land, and
that the court should accept the doctrine as a desirable exception to the
general rule based upon the social interests involved.3
4
=See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Krayenbuh (1902), 65 Neb. 889, 91 N. W. 880.2 1 Indianapolis 'Water Co. v. Harold (1907), 170 Ind. 170, 83 N. E. 993.
C. B. & Q. R. B. Co. v. Krayenbuhl (1902), 65 Neb. 889, 909, 91 N. W. 880.
Carr v. Oregon-W~ashington R. & Nas. Co. (1927), 123 Ore. 259, 261 Paa. 899,
904; Taylor v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. B. Co. (1927), 180,Ia. 702, 163 N. W. 406.
But see Price v. Atchison Water Co. (1897), 158 Kans. 551, 50 Pac. 450.
24 City of Indianapolis v. Emmelman (1886), 108 Ind. 530, 9 N. E. 155.
nChicago, etc., R. Co. v. Fox (1906), 38 Ind. App. 268, 70 N. E. 81 ; Lewis v.
Cleveland, etc. R. Co. (1908), 42 Ind. App. 337, 84 N. E. 23; Fort 'Wayne, etc.
Traction Co. v. Starlk (1920), 74 Ind. App. 669, 127 N. E. 460.
=City of Indianapolis v. Emmelman (1886), 108 'nd. 530, 9 N. E. 155; Chicago,
etc. R. Co. v. Fox (1906), 38 Ind. App. 268, 40 N. D. 81; Lewis v. Cleveland, etc.
R. Co. (1908) 42 Ind. App. 337, 84 N. E. 26; 'Wilmen v Chicago & W. B. Co. (1916),
175 Ia. 101, 156 N. W. 877.
=Lathan v. R. Johnson & Nephen (1913), 1 M B. 398.
=Bohlen, 69 U. of Pa. L. R. 142, 347; Studies in Torts, 190.
= 36 Harv. L. Rev. 850, see also II Harv. L. Rev. 440.
0B. d 0. S. 'V. R. Co. v. Bradford (1895), 20 Ind. App. 348, 49 N. E. 388.
31 Bohlen, 69 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 142, 347; Studies In Torts, 190; Ryan v. Tower
(1901), 128 Mich. 463, 87 N. W. 644; Bottum v. Hawks (1911), 84 Vt. 370, 79
AtI. 858, Ann Cas. 1913 A, 1025.
=Bohlen, 69 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 142, 347; Studies in Torts, 190; 36 Harv. L. Rev.
850.
3 John C. Townes, 1 Tex. L. R. 1, 8.
4j3eremiah Smith, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 439; Manely 0. Hudson, 36 Harv. L. Rev.
849; Bohlen, 69 U. of Pa. L. I. 142, 347; Studies in Torts, 190.
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Once it is shown that the particular occupier has failed to use due
care, the contributory negligence of the child may bar recovery in most
jurisdictions.35 The child, of course, must be of such an age as to be
capable of being negligent,36 and the mere fact of trespass is not itself
negligence.37
Under the facts alleged in the principal case, it seems clear that it was
properly decided. The defendant could have anticipated the presence of
children, and it was forseeable that the "damps" involved an unreasonable
risk of bodily harm to them. The children could not discover the exist-
ence or extent of the risk, and, at a small cost, the defendant could have
protected them from it. R. S. M.
GIFTs--CoRPoRATE STOCK-DEIaERY.--On June 8, 1924, John G. Kratli,
being the owner of a certificate of shares of corporate stock, caused to be
written upon the back of said certificate an indorsement transferring it
to Frank W. Kratli, his son. The indorsement was dated, witnessed, and
signed by the indorser. From the time of the indorsement to the death
of the indorser in January, 1929, the certificate was kept in his safety
deposit box, to which he held the only key except the one kept by the
bank. All dividends paid on the stock during this time were paid to
John G. Kratli. The son, indorsee of the certificate, claimed a gift inter
vivos of the certificate. Frequently, during the summer of 1928, the son
accompanied his father, the decedent, to the bank. Held, there was not
a gift inter vivos. Judgment for claimant, reversed.1
While the law requires delivery of the gift to be made and many
cases state the rule to be that there must be an absolute transfer of the
property from the donor to the donee, 2 several cases modify this rule by
holding that it is not to be enforced arbitrarily 3 and it should be the object
of the court not to defeat, but rather to carry into effect, the intention
of the intestate, if it is able to do so without violation of some controlling
15Kent v. Interstate Public Service Co. (1929), 168 N. El. 465; Indianapolis
Water Co. v. Harold (1907), 170 Ind. 170, 83 N. E. 993.
30 The Louisville, N. A. etc. R. Co. v. Leass (1894), 11 Ind. App. 654, 38 N. E.
774.
3 Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Dundem (1887), 37 Kans. 1, 14 Pac. 501.
SKratli v. Starke County Trust & Savings Bank, Appellate Court of Indiana,
December 23, 1932, 183 N. E. 696.
-Hayes v. McKinney (1919), 73 Ind. App. 105, 126 N. E. 497; Tenbrook u
Brown (1861), 17 Ind. 410; Smith v. Dorsey (1872), 38 Ind. 451; 10 Am. Re
216; Daubenspect v. Biggs, 71 Ind. 255; Buschian v. Hughart, 28 Ind. 449; Smith
v. Ferguson, 90 Ind. 229, 46 Am. Rep. 216; Pruitt v. Pruitt, 91 Ind. 595; Bingham
v. Stage, 123 Ind. 281; Richard v. Reeve&, 149 Ind. 427; Martin v. McCullough,
Adm. (1893), 136 Ind. 331, 34 N. E. 819; Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramse3
(1913), 55 Ind. App. 40, 100 N. E. 1049, 102 N. E1. 282; Reasoner, Adm. V. Bohnd
(1921), 76 Ind. App. 114, 129 N. E. 490; Ogdon, Adm. v. 'Washington Nati. Bank
(1924), 82 Ind. App. 187, 145 N. E. 514; Snyder v. Frank (1912), 53 Ind. App.
301, 101 N. B. 684; Dewey v. Barnhouse (1910), 83 Kans. 12, 109 Pac. 1081, 29
L. R. A. (N. S.) 166; Miller v. Williams (1923), 195 Iowa 1305, 192 N. W. 798;
Jones v. Jones (1918, Mo.), 201 S. W. 557; Edson v. Lucas (1931), 40 Fed. (2)
398; Copland v. Commissioner (1931), 41 Fed. (2) 501.
Teague v. Abbott (1912), 51 Ind. App. 604, 100 N. E. 27; Ross, Exr. v. Wat.
kins (1923), 80 Ind. App. 487, 141 N. E. 477; Stephenson's Adm. v. King, etc.
(1883), 81 Ky. 425, 50 Am. Rep. 173.
